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INTRODUCTION

For motives including racism, greed, and scarcity of resources,' the
validity of Indian treaties is being challenged on grounds that the treaties have become enervated by age and circumstance and should be
abrogated for the ostensible benefit of both Indian and non-Indian
citizens.2 As a consequence of a legislative stalemate in Minnesota,3
the Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians ("Band") and the State of
Minnesota ("State") went to trial in May 1994 over rights reserved by
the Chippewa Indians in a treaty made with the United States government in 1837.
The court was petitioned to determine whether the rights granted in
the Treaty of 1837 were ever terminated and whether the State could
enforce state regulations prohibiting netting and spearing of fish4 on
the territory ceded in the 1837 treaty against band members.5 The
court ultimately held that these rights had not been terminated and
reserved the issue of the validity of the State's regulatory efforts for
Phase II of the trial. 6 This Comment focuses on the initial arguments
presented for interpreting the hunting, fishing, and gathering rights
reserved in the 1837 treaty and on the court's decision to uphold the
Band's treaty rights.
Part II of this Comment provides a background on Indian treaties
and the special canons of construction used by courts to interpret
these treaties. Part III explores the separation of treaty regulation
among the federal government, tribal nations, and state governments.
Part IV presents a brief overview of the evolution of Federal Indian
1. "[L]egislators have been hearing grumbling from constituents about how the
Indians already 'have enough' with their prosperous casinos. Those constituents sent
the message that they'd rather lose in a court fight than 'give away' anything to the
Indians." Robert Whereatt, Victimized by Politics; Divided Leadership in Legislature Helped
Doom Milk Lacs Treaty Bill STARTWB. (Mpls.) May 9, 1993, at lB. The chief Minnesota
House sponsor of the Mille Lacs treaty bill, Representative David Battaglia (DFL-Two
Harbors), said "some [House] members told him they had taken a politically tough vote
earlier in the [1993] session in approving the bill that extended human rights protection to gays and lesbians. They were not about to take a second such vote." That
amounts to racism, according to Battaglia. Id.
2. KIRKE KICKINGBIRD ET AL., INDIAN TREATIES 6 (1980)

(citing the Native American

Equal Opportunities Act of 1977, H.R. 1054, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. (1977)).
3. See infra part VI.
4. Treaty with the Chippewa, July 29, 1837, U.S.-Chippewa, 7 Stat. 536, reprinted in
INSTITTE FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF INDIAN LAw, TREATIES & AGREEMENTS OF THE CHIP-

67-69 (1974) ("1837 Treaty").
5. See MINN. STAT. §§ 97C.325 (1992) (prohibiting fishing with nets); 97C.371
(1992) (restricting spear fishing).
6. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa v. Minnesota, F. Supp.
,
, Civ. No.
4-90-605, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11901 *1, *64 (D. Minn. Aug. 24, 1994).
PEWA INDIANS,
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policy, and Part V presents background on the treaties of 1837, 1842,
1854, and 1855 between the Chippewa tribes and the federal government. Part VI describes the dispute between the Band and the State.
Part VII analyzes the viability of the primary arguments presented by
the parties and concludes that the court should find that the hunting,
fishing, and gathering rights guaranteed in the treaty of 1837 were
never terminated and that the regulations the State seeks to enforce
are both discriminatory and unnecessary for conservation purposes.
Part VIII summarizes the trial court's recent holding in this case. This
Comment then concludes with a brief discussion of the implications of
the court's determination that these treaty rights have not been
terminated.
II.

A.

BACKGROUND ON INDIAN TREATIES

Origins

Treaties between Indian tribes and the federal government are considered contracts between two sovereign nations7 and are equal in
force to treaties between the federal government and foreign nations.8
Treaties between the United States and Indian tribes9 constitute an
important recognition and guarantee of Indian rights.10 These treaties envision a "measured separatism"1 1 for an important minority1 2 of
7. Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n,
443 U.S. 658, 675 (1979).
8. Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet) 1, 63 (1831).
9. The Supreme Court concluded long ago that the Constitution recognizes the
ability of the United States and the Indian nations to enter into treaties. See Worcester
v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 558-60 (1832) (concluding that acts of the Georgia
Legislature interfered with the relations established between the United States and the
Cherokee nation).
10. See United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 381 (1905) (stating a "treaty [is] not a
grant of rights to the Indians, but a grant of rights from them-a reservation of those
not granted").
11. See Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 556-57 (discussing notion of separatism). Indian treaties cover a wide range of subjects, including trade, extradition, war and peace,
political sovereignty, territorial boundaries, hunting and fishing rights, relations with
other countries, and general assistance benefits. See generally FELIX S. COHEN, HANDBOOK OF FEDERAL INDIAN LAw 38-46 (1942); Charles F. Wilkinson &John M. Volkman,
JudicialReview of Indian Treaty Abrogation: "As Long as Water Flows, or Grass Grows Upon the
Earth" - How Long a Time Is That?, 63 CALIF. L. REV. 601, 602-12 (1975). Rights such as
land occupancy are necessary for maintaining Indian culture and cannot be truly compensated for with money. Id. at 604-07.
12. The 1990 census reported approximately 2 million Indians living in the United
States. See UNITED STATES DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED
STATES, Table No. 12 (1993). Roughly one-half of the Indian population lives on-reservation. See DAVID H. GETCHES ET AL., FEDERAL INDIAN LAw: CASES AND MATERIALS § 110,
at 7 (2d ed. 1986). However, despite their relatively small numbers, Indian tribes have
managed to retain control over substantial land, energy, and mineral resources. Id. at
13, 614.
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society that seeks to maintain a distinct identity and status as a separate
nation.' 3
Generally, the United States entered into treaties with Indian tribes
to end wars and acquire land. 14 At the same time, tribal governments
used treaties to confirm and retain rights such as the sovereign right of
self-government, fishing and hunting rights, and jurisdictional rights
over their own lands.15
The treaties typically consist of an agreement by several Indian tribes
to relinquish their rights to vast amounts of aboriginal lands in exchange for money, retained hunting and fishing rights, and confinement to a reservation.1 6 The reservation system sought to minimize
confrontations between settlers and the tribes.17 In addition, the
United States government intended to use the reservation system as a
means of transforming Indians into "a pastoral and civilized people."18
"Under the [S]upremacy [C]lause of the United States Constitution,[19] Indian treaty provisions supersede conflicting state laws or
state constitutional provisions" 20 and can only be abrogated by Congress with specific evidence of Congressional intent to do so. 2 1 The

validity of Indian treaties has long been upheld, despite attempts to
13.

See VINE DELORIA, JR., BEHIND THE TRAIL OF BROKEN TREATIES: AN INDIAN DECLA-

4-5 (1974); see also GETCHES, supra note 12, at 18-20.
supra note 2, at 2.

RATION OF INDEPENDENCE

14.

KICKINrBIRD,

15. Id.
16. Bradley I. Nye, Where Do The Buffalo Roam? Determiningthe Scope of American Indian Off-Reservation Hunting Rights in the Pacific Northwes 67 WAsH. L. REv. 175, 178
(1992) (citing Robert M. Kvasnicka, United States Indian Treaties and Agreements, in 4
HANDBOOK OF NORTH AMERICAN INDIANS 195 (Washburn ed. 1988)).
17. Id.
18. Id. (citing Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 576 (1908)).
19. Article 6 of the Constitution provides in relevant part:
This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in
Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the
Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the
Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or
Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.
U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
20. Nye, supra note 16, at 178 (citing State v. Arthur, 261 P.2d. 135, 141 (Idaho
1953), cert. denied, 347 U.S. 937 (1954)). See, e.g., Antoine v. Washington, 420 U.S. 194,
204 (1975) (noting that Supremacy Clause precludes application of state game laws in
conflict with federal statutes ratifying agreements between the Executive Branch and
Indian tribes); United States v. Forty-Three Gallons of Whiskey, 93 U.S. 188, 196
(1876), appeal after remand, 108 U.S. 491 (1883) (prohibiting the introduction and sale
of spirituous liquors in Indian country); Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515,
558-60 (1832) (stating that Congress has the "sole and exclusive right" to regulate
trade with Indian tribes).
21. See, e.g., United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 738 (1986) (finding that the
Supreme Court has required that "Congress's intention to abrogate Indian treaty rights
be clear and plain"). The loss of Indian rights due to abrogation is lessened to some
degree by the Fifth Amendment's takings clause, which has been construed to require
that compensation be given for certain abrogations. See, e.g., United States v. Sioux
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attack the treaties. 22 By upholding the validity of these treaties, the
courts "are confirming the continued sovereignty of Indian nations."23
The status of the Indian nations has been the subject of much debate. 2 4 Although the Supreme Court does not recognize Indian tribes
as "states" under international law, 25 the Court has described Indian
sovereignty to be of a "unique and limited character."26 As a result of
the tribes' unique and limited character, courts have developed several
27
special rules of construction for interpreting Indian treaties.
B.

Statutory Canons

There are three special canons of construction for interpreting Indian treaties. These canons address the specific issues of (1) ambiguity, (2) interpretation, and (3) liberal construction.
Nation, 448 U.S. 371, 401-23 (1980); Shoshone Tribe v. United States, 299 U.S. 476, 497
(1937), appeal after remand, 304 U.S. 111 (1938). See also COHEN, supra note 11, at 468.
22. See Worcester31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 559 (stating that the United States Constitution
allows Congress to make treaties with Indian tribes); Turner v. American Baptist Missionary Union, 24 Fed. Case 344 (C.C.D. Mich. 1852) (No. 14,251). "Since the commencement of the government, treaties have been made with the Indians, and the
treaty-making power has been exercised in making them. They are treaties, within the
meaning of the Constitution, and, as such, are the supreme laws of the land." Id. at 346.
23. KICKINGBIRD, supra note 2, at 39.
24. Compare Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1, 18 (1831) (holding
that the Cherokee tribe could not be regarded as a "foreign state" within the meaning
of article III of the Constitution, so as to permit them to bring an original action in the
Supreme Court) with Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 559 (stating that "[t]he Indian nations
had always been considered as distinct, independent, political communities, retaining
their original natural rights"). See also Frank B. Higgins, InternationalLaw Consideration
of the American Indian Nations by the United States, 3 Auz. L. Rav. 74, 74-77 (1961) (stating
that Indians have a peculiar status as "qualified national entities" and yet they are "subject to unilateral fiat of United States sovereign power").
25. Early on, the Court rejected the notion that Indian nations possessed the full
sovereignty of foreign nations. See Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 561 (using analogy to
"tributary" or "feudatory" states); Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. (5 Pet.) at 18 (stating that
Indian nations are not foreign nations within meaning of article III);Johnson v. McIntosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 574 (1823) (holding Indians' "rights to complete sovereignty, as independent nations, [are] necessarily diminished"). However, the Court has
held that tribal sovereignty predates the Constitution and that Indian nations, in addition to the federal government and the states, possess a third source of sovereignty in
the United States. See United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 319-32 (1978); Talton v.
Mayes, 163 U.S. 376, 384 (1896). See alsoJohn Howard Clinebell &Jim Thomson, Sovereignty and Self-Determination: The Rights of Native Americans Under InternationalLaw, 27
Burr. L. REv. 669, 683-700 (1978).
26. Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 323. The Court also stated that Indian sovereignty is subject
to "complete defeasance" by Congress. Id.
27. See, e.g., Worcester 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 582 (stating "[t]he language used in treaties
with the Indians shall never be construed to their prejudice"). See also United States v.
Choctaw Nation, 179 U.S. 494, 531-36 (1900) (stating that the way that Indians understood the words, rather than the words' critical meaning, should control).
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First, ambiguous expressions are resolved in the tribes' favor. 28 For
example, in Washington v. Washington State Commercial PassengerFishing

Vessel Ass'n,29 the Court held that the words "in common with" and
"right of taking fish" suggest an entitlement to a share of fish, rather
than just an equal opportunity to fish.30 This canon developed because although treaties should have been understandable to the Indians, the treaties were written exclusively in English, a language few
Indians could read or understand at the time the treaties were
formed.31
Second, treaties are interpreted as the Indians themselves would
have understood them.3 2 This rule developed to rectify the unequal
bargaining position the tribes held during treaty negotiations.3S This
28. See, e.g., McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164, 174 (1973)
(finding that "doubtful expressions are to be resolved in favor of the weak and defenseless people who are wards of the nation"). For example, a treaty phrase providing for

reservation land "to be held as Indian lands are held" included, by implication, the
rights to fish and hunt on that land. Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S. 404,
405-06 (1968).
In Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564 (1908), the Court stated:
By a rule of interpretation of agreements and treaties with the Indians, ambiguities occurring will be resolved from the standpoint of the Indians. And the
rule should certainly be applied to determine between two inferences, one of
which would support the purpose of the agreement and the other impair or
defeat it ...it cannot be supposed that the Indians were alert to exclude by
formal words every inference which might militate against or defeat the declared purpose of themselves and the Government.
Id. at 576. See also United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371, 380 (1905) (finding that the
courts will construe a treaty with the Indians as "that unlettered people" understood the
treaty).
29. 443 U.S. 658 (1979).
30. Id. at 659.
31. Wilkinson & Volkman, supra note 11, at 610. The authors of that article point
out that when more than one Indian tribe was involved in treaty negotiations, the government officials frequently used one language believing it was common to all. Id. In
fact, the words carried very different meanings to each of the tribes. Id. at 610-11. See
generally Duwamish Indians v. United States, 79 Ct. Cl. 530 (1934), cert. denied, 295 U.S.
755 (1935).
32. See, e.g., Choctaw Nation v. Oklahoma, 397 U.S. 620, 631 (1970), reh'g denied,
398 U.S. 945 (1970) (stating that interpretation of the treaties is based on the Indians'
understanding of the treaty). For example, the right to hunt on "unoccupied lands of
the United States" included a corollary right to fish on those same lands in part because
"the particular Indian languages did not employ separate verbs to distinguish between
hunting and fishing but rather used a general term for hunting and coupled this with
the noun corresponding to the object (either animal or vegetable) sought." State v.
Tinno, 497 P.2d 1386, 1389 (Idaho 1972).
33. In Jones v. Meehan, 175 U.S. 1 (1899), the Court articulated the following rationale for adopting this principle:
In construing any treaty between the United States and an Indian tribe, it must
always ... be borne in mind that the negotiations for the treaty are conducted,
on the part of the United States, an enlightened and powerful nation, by representatives skilled in diplomacy, masters of a written language, understanding
the modes and forms of creating the various technical estates known to their
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special canon continues to be followed by modern courts3 4 and this
rule has been said to be "virtually identical to the doctrine of contra
proferentum used in interpreting contracts."35
Third, treaties must be liberally construed in favor of the tribes.36
This canon recognizes that treaty hunting and fishing rights are usually
construed not as a grant to the Indians from the federal government,
but rather as a reservation of rights not ceded to the federal government.3 7 Courts apply this canon to ensure that justice and fairness is
maintained for the tribes that entered into these treaties.38
These special canons have been established primarily to encourage
narrow construction of treaties to protect against invasions of Indian
law, and assisted by an interpreter employed by themselves; that the treaty is
drawn up by them and in their own language; that the Indians, on the other
hand, are a weak and dependent people, who have no written language and
are wholly unfamiliar with all the forms of legal expression, and whose only
knowledge of the terms in which the treaty is framed is that imparted to them
by the interpreter employed by the United States.
Id. at 10-11. See also Tulee v. Washington, 315 U.S. 681, 684-85 (1942) (stating that it is
the court's responsibility to carry out the terms of the treaty "in a spirit which generously recognizes the full obligation of this nation to protect the interests of a dependent
people").
34. See, e.g., Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel
Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658, 675-76 (1979) (noting the superior knowledge and negotiating
skills of the United States, the Court held that the treaty must be construed broadly in
the Indians' favor); Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Chippewa v. Wisconsin, 653 F. Supp.
1420, 1429 (W.D. Wis. 1987) (holding that treaties must be construed in favor of the
Indians and as the Indians understand them).
35. Kenneth D. Nelson, Wisconsin, Walleye, and the Supreme Law of the Land: An Overview of the Chippewa Indian Treaty Rights Dispute in Northern Wsconsin, 11 HAMULNEJ. PUB.
L. & POL'Y 381, 383 (1990) (citing BLACK'S LAw DICIONARY 327 (6th ed. 1990), which
defines contra proferentum as interpreting "an ambiguous provision most strongly against
the person who selected the language"). See, e.g., Rhone-Poulenc Basic Chems. Co. v.
American Motorists Ins. Co., 616 A.2d 1192, 1196 (Del. 1992) (noting that to the extent
that ambiguity exists in an insurance contract, "the doctrine of contra proferentum requires that the language of [the contract] be construed most strongly against the [party]
that drafted it").
36. See, e.g., Choctaw Nation v. United States, 318 U.S. 423, 431-32 (1943) (stating
that Indian treaties "are to be construed, so far as possible, in the sense in which the
Indians understood them, and 'in a spirit which generously recognizes the full obligation of this nation to protect the interests of a dependent people'" (quoting Tulee v.
Washington, 315 U.S. 681, 684-85 (1942))). For instance, the Court has liberally construed a treaty providing for lands "to be held as Indian lands are held" to reserve
hunting and fishing rights to the tribe. Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S.
404, 406 (1968). Moreover, in United States v. Winans, 198 U.S. 371 (1905), the
Supreme Court held that language reserving to Indians the right to fish at "usual and
accustomed places" included an easement to cross over private lands in order to reach
these places. Id. at 384.
37. Winans, 198 U.S. at 381.
38. See, e.g., id. at 380-81. "[W]e will construe a treaty with the Indians... as justice
and reason demand in all cases where power is exerted by the strong over those to
whom they owe care and protection." Id.
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interests and to provide broad construction favoring Indian rights.39
However, these canons of construction are applicable only where con40
gressional intent is unclear as to the terms of the agreement.
III.
A.

REGULATION OF TREATr

RIGHTS

Federal Regulation
1. Regulations Limiting Treaty Rights

Efforts by the federal government to regulate express or implied Indian treaty rights to hunt and fish raise questions regarding federal
versus tribal jurisdiction. Although Congress has the power to abrogate Indian hunting and fishing treaty rights,41 only the tribes can regulate on-reservation fishing and hunting unless Congress acts
affirmatively to regulate these rights.42 However, where the federal

government has jurisdiction to regulate off-reservation reserved rights,
that federal power is plenary.43
Congress can use this plenary power to unilaterally abrogate or modify off-reservation treaty rights,44 and is limited only by the takings re39. Philip P. Frickey, CongressionalIntent, PracticalReasoning, and the Dynamic Nature
of Federal Indian Law, 78 CALIF. L. REv. 1137, 1140-41 (1990). "Sometimes courts will
find an invasion of Indian rights only upon a 'clear showing' of legislative intent; other
times, such an invasion will not be 'lightly implied'; still other cases suggest that such an
invasion may be found only after the court has engaged in 'liberal construction' in favor
of Indian rights." Id. at 1141, n.27 (citing Charles F. Wilkinson & John M. Volkman,
JudicialReview of Indian Treaty Abrogation: "As Long as Water Fows, or Grass Grows Upon the
Earth" - How Long a Time Is That?, 63 CALIF. L. REv. 601, 623-26 (1975)).
40. Id. at 1141. "The canon of construction regarding the resolution of ambiguities
in favor of Indians... does not permit reliance on ambiguities that do not exist; nor
does it permit disregard of the clearly expressed intent of Congress." Id. at 1141 n.28
(citing United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 739-40 (1986); South Carolina v. Catawba
Indian Tribe, 476 U.S. 498, 506 (1986)).
41. See United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 745 (1986) (holding that the Bald Eagle
Protection Act abrogated Indian treaty rights).
42. See New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 330 (1983) (holding
that the tribe rather than the state regulates elk hunting on the reservation). See also
United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312, 337 (W.D. Wash. 1974) (stating that
treaty rights "may be limited or modified in any particular way or to any extent by or
with authority of Congress"), aff'd, 520 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
1086, reh'g denied, 424 U.S. 978 (1976). In Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock, 187 U.S. 553 (1903),
the Supreme Court held that Congress could, in a pressing national emergency, do
whatever was necessary with Indian lands. The Court, however, was unable to point out
exactly what emergency existed. Id. at 564.
43. This power is based on the Commerce, Treaty, and Supremacy Clauses of the
United States Constitution. COHEN, supra note 11 at 219-20.
44. Lone Wolf, 187 U.S. at 564-67. Although judicial review of federal legislation
passed pursuant to this plenary power has traditionally been limited, the Supreme
Court has indicated a movement toward a more searching review. See generally, Comment, FederalPlenary Power in Indian Affairs After Weeks and Sioux Nation, 131 U. PA. L.
REv. 235 (1982).
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strictions of the Fifth Amendment. 45 However, federal regulation of
off-reservation hunting and fishing rights must be authorized by federal statute as regulation that is essentially a modification of those
rights.46 Congress could regulate every aspect of Indian hunting and
fishing if desired, 47 but the federal government generally has sparingly
regulated Indian hunting and fishing.48
2. Regulations Protecting Treaty Rights
A significant counterweight to Congress's plenary power is the federal trust responsibility.49 This federal trust responsibility is analogous
to the relationship between a guardian and a ward.5 0 The primary
goals of this guardianship is to promote tribal self-government and
preserve tribal sovereignty.5 1
In light of the federal government's role as a guardian, courts generally refuse to imply congressional intent to abrogate treaty rights absent an explicit statement of congressional intent. 52 Moreover, courts
45.
(stating
good").
ERTY §§
46.

See U.S. CONST. amend. V. See alsoAndrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 64-68 (1979)
the government regulation "involves the adjustment of rights for the public
See generally RIcHARD R. POWELL & PATic:KJ. RoitN, THE LAw Or RFAL PROP866-866.6 (1984).
COHEN, supra note 11, at 467-68.

47. Although Congress has the power to extinguish Indian hunting and fishing
rights, a court will not recognize an extinguishment of these vital rights unless Congress
has clearly expressed an intention to eliminate them. In Menominee Tribe v. United States,
391 U.S. 404 (1968), the Supreme Court held that the Menominee tribe retained hunting and fishing rights even though Congress had terminated the reservation, since the
termination statute did not mention hunting and fishing rights. Id. at 415-17.
48. Hunting and fishing have been left largely for tribal regulation. However, in
one instance where the tribe failed to act, federal authorities prosecuted a tribal member under a federal trespass statute, 18 U.S.C. § 1165 (1988), that forbids unauthorized
entry upon Indian lands for the purpose of hunting, trapping, or fishing. The statute
was held to be inapplicable to Indians. See United States v.Jackson, 600 F.2d 1283 (9th
Cir. 1979). In 1981, however, Congress amended the Lacey Act to prohibit transport of,
or traffic in, fish or wildlife taken, possessed, or sold in violation of any federal, state, or
tribal law. 16 U.S.C. § 3372(a) (1988). That prohibition was held applicable to Indians. See United States v. Sohappy, 770 F.2d 816 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. denied, 477 U.S. 906
(1986).
49. A discussion of federal trust responsibility is found in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia,
30 U.S. (5 Pet.) 1 (1831), where Justice Marshall found that tribes were "domestic dependent nations" that looked to the federal government for protection. Id. at 17.
50. Under federal law, the United States Attorney must represent tribes in "all suits
at law and equity." 25 U.S.C. § 175 (1988). However, this duty has been held to be
discretionary in some situations. See, e.g.,Joint Tribal Council of Passamaquoddy Tribe
v. Morton, 388 F. Supp. 649 (D. Me.), aff'd, 528 F.2d 370 (1st Cir. 1975).
51. See New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 334-35 (1983) (noting federal government commitment to furthering tribal self-government).
52. See, e.g., Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S. 404, 413 (1968) (refusing
to find that a federal statute terminating the tribe's reservation also destroyed the
tribe's hunting and fishing rights).
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have applied this same test to determine whether federal statutes of
general application apply equally to Indian and non-Indian citizens
when application of the statute would conflict with guaranteed treaty
53
rights.
When Indian treaty rights are threatened, the United States government has a firmly established duty under the Federal Indian trust relationship to "take legal action to help protect those rights."54 The
Supreme Court has characterized this trust responsibility as a "moral
obligation[ ] of the highest responsibility and trust."55 However, the
United States government often ignores this duty5 6 as a consequence
of the various conflicts of interest the federal government faces in
many of the legal actions involving Indian tribes. 57 These conflicts occur when the "national interests" that the federal government must
advocate run counter to the "private interests" of the Indian tribes that
58
the federal government also has an obligation to advance.
The results can be a mixed blessing for the tribes even when the
government does not ignore this trust duty.5 9 Even when attempting
to help, the federal government can sometimes damage Indian
53. Statutes of general applicability that conflict with Indian treaty rights will be
found to abrogate treaty hunting rights if Congress has shown a clear intent to do so,
but may also abrogate those rights by implication. Compare United States v. White, 508
F.2d 453, 458-59 (8th Cir. 1974) (holding the Bald Eagle Protection Act, 16 U.S.C.
§§ 668a-668d (1988), did not abrogate treaty-based hunting rights because it did not
expressly address Indian hunting rights) with United States v. Fryberg, 622 F.2d 1010,
1016 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 1004 (1980) (holding the Bald Eagle Protection
Act abrogated Indian treaty rights by implication). The Supreme Court apparenty resolved this particular issue by holding that the Bald Eagle Protection Act abrogated
Indian treaty hunting rights by implication. United States v. Dion, 476 U.S. 734, 745
(1986).
54. GILBERT L. HALL, THE FEDERAL-INDIAN TRUST RELATIONSHIP: THE DlYIv OF PROTECTION 43 (1981) (citing McClanahan v. Arizona State Tax Comm'n, 411 U.S. 164
(1973); United States v. Washington, 520 F.2d 676 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1086
(1975), rehg denied, 424 U.S. 978 (1976)).
55. Seminole Nation v. United States, 316 U.S. 286, 297 (1942).
56. HALL, supra note 54, at 43. "It took a law suit by the Passamaquoddies to force
the Department of Justice to represent the tribe in its land claim against the state of
Maine." Id. at 69 n.26 (citing Edwardsen v. Morton, 369 F. Supp. 1359 (D. D.C. 1973);
Gila River Pima Maricopa Indian Community v. United States, 427 F.2d 1194 (Ct. Cl.
1970)).
57. See MONROE E. PRICE, LAw AND THE AMERICAN INDIAN 600-01 (1973).
58. Id.
No self-respecting law firm would ever allow itself to represent two opposing
clients in one dispute; yet the Federal government has frequently found itself

in precisely that position. There is considerable evidence that the Indians are

the losers when such situations arise. More than that, the credibility of the
Federal government is damaged whenever it appears that such a conflict of
interest exists.

Id. at 601.
59.

HALL, supra note 54, at 43.
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rights.60 One cannot dispute, however, that when the United States
government mobilizes federal legal forces and financial resources "[the
government] can be an effective legal advocate for Indian interests."61
B.

Tribal Regulation
1.

Origin and Extent of Regulation

Tribal regulatory jurisdiction arises both from the retained inherent
sovereignty of Indian tribes62 and from Indian treaties. 63 To that end,
the concept of tribal sovereignty has been the basis for Supreme Court
decisions upholding "a tribe's asserted power to criminally prosecute
tribal members, [64] to impose taxes on non-members who engage in
on-reservation activities, [65] to determine tribal membership, [66] and to
7
define the rules of property inheritance."6
Additionally, Indian treaties have been found to impliedly reserve
exclusive on-reservation resource exploitation rights for Indian
tribes.68 Courts have held that "[Indian] tribes with treaty rights can
fish and hunt on their reservation without any state regulation except
that necessary for conservation purposes."69
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. New Mexico v. Mescalero Apache Tribe, 462 U.S. 324, 337 (1983) (holding that
in the interest of tribal sovereignty and the absence of state interests the application of
state hunting and fishing laws to the reservation is preempted). See also Washington v.
Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 152 (1980), reh'g denied, 448 U.S. 911 (1980) (holding that tribal sovereignty encompasses tribal control
over members and territory); United States v. Wheeler, 435 U.S. 313, 323 (1978) (stating "Indian tribes still possess those aspects of sovereignty not withdrawn by treaty or
statute, or by implication as a necessary result of their dependent status").

63. Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 558-59 (1981), reh'g denied, 452 U.S.
911 (1981) (holding that an Indian tribe did not have regulatory jurisdiction where it
did not exercise "absolute and undisturbed use and occupation" of the land).
64. See Wheeler, 435 U.S. at 332.

65. See Merrion v.Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130 (1982). Cf Moe v. Confederated Salish & Kootenai Tribes, 425 U.S. 463 (1976) (denying state taxation of on-reservation Indians).
66. See Cherokee Intermarriage Cases, 203 U.S. 76 (1906).
67. Laurie Reynolds, Indian Hunting and FishingRights: The Role of Tribal Sovereignty

and Preemption, 62 N.C. L. REv. 743, 759 (1984).
68. See, e.g., Menominee Tribe v. United States, 391 U.S. 404, 406 (1968) (noting
that the 1854 Treaty of Wolf River included the right to hunt and fish although not
expressly mentioned in the treaty).
69. Robert J. Miller, Native Rights: Indian Hunting and Fishing Rights, 21 ENVrL. L.
1291, 1292 (1991) (citing Tulee v. Washington, 315 U.S. 681, 685 (1942); Puyallup
Tribe v. Department of Game of Wash., 433 U.S. 165, 175 (1977)). See also Antoine v.
Washington, 420 U.S. 194, 207 (1975) (noting the State's failure to establish that a ban
on out-of-season deer hunting by Indians is in any way necessary or useful for deer
conservation). But see Department of Game of Wash. v. Puyallup Tribe, 414 U.S. 44, 49
(1973). "The treaty does not give the Indians a federal right to pursue the last steelhead until it enters their nets." Id. The Puyallup decisions, however, have been criti-
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A tribe's exclusive authority to regulate on-reservation hunting and
fishing is derived in part from the tribe's power to exclude nonmembers from the reservation 7 Oand in part from the tribe's retained inherent sovereignty over tribal territory. 71 Pursuant to their authority to
regulate "internal [affairs] and social relations,"72 some Indian tribes
have adopted codes controlling the time, place, and manner of hunting and fishing by tribal members. 73 In addition, " [v] iolations of tribal
codes may subject members to the criminal jurisdiction of tribal
courts."74

Indian tribes have also retained rights regarding off-reservation fishing and hunting. 75 As such, "Indians cannot be restricted [by states] as
to what fishing gear they use or by a catch limit."76 In addition,
"[t]ribal members cannot be charged a license fee [by a state] to exercized for failing to adequately explain why a state could regulate for conservation
purposes. Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Chippewa v. Wisconsin, 653 F. Supp. 1420, 1434
(W.D. Wis. 1987). For a critique of the Lac Courte Oreilles court's reliance on the Puyallup decisions, see David Michael Ujke, Note, State Regulation of Lake Superior Chippewa Off
Reservation Usufructuay Rights: Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Chippewa Indians v. Wisconsin,
653 F. Supp. 1420 (WD. Wis. 1987), 11 HAMLINE L. REV. 153 (1988).
70. See Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe, 455 U.S. 130, 131 (1982) (holding that
"[e]ven if the Tribe's power to tax were derived solely from its power to exclude nonIndians from the reservation, the Tribe [still] has the authority to impose [a] severance
tax"); Quechan Tribe v. Rowe, 531 F.2d 408, 410 (9th Cir. 1976) (holding that "[i]n the
absence of treaty provisions or congressional pronouncements to the contrary, the tribe
has the inherent power to exclude non-members from the reservation"); Ortiz-Barraza
v. United States, 512 F.2d 1176, 1179-80 (9th Cir. 1975) (noting that an Indian tribe
may lawfully empower police officers to aid in the enforcement of tribal law and in the
exercise of tribal power).
71. Merion, 455 U.S. at 137 (stating that "[t]he power to tax is ariessential attribute
of Indian sovereignty"); Washington v. Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134, 152, reh'g denied, 448 U.S. 911 (1980) (Brennan, J. & Marshall, J.,
concurring in part, dissenting in part) (stating that "[tihe power to tax transactions
occurring on trust lands and significantly involving a tribe or its members is a fundamental attribute of sovereignty which the tribes retain unless divested of it by federal
law or necessary implication of their dependent status" (citing United States v. Wheeler,
435 U.S. 313 (1978)); United States v. Mazurie, 419 U.S. 544, 557 (1975) (stating that
"Indian tribes are unique aggregations possessing attributes of sovereignty over both
their members and their territory" (citing Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515,
557 (1832)).
72. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375, 382 (1886), quoted in Reynolds, supra
note 67, at 760.
73. Reynolds, supra note 67, at 760.
74. Id. (citing Puyallup Tribe v. Starr-Moses, 10 Indian L. Rep. 6028 (Puyallup Tribal Ct. 1983)).
75. Miller, supra note 69, at 1293 (citing Antoine v. Washington, 420 U.S. 194, 206
(1975)).
76. Id. (citing Puyallup Tribe'v. Department of Game of Wash., 433 U.S. 165
(1977)). "Only necessary conservation methods can limit the Indian catch and they
must be reasonable and nondiscriminatory." Id. at 1293 n.14 (citing Department of
Game of Wash. v. Puyallup Tribe, 414 U.S. 44, 48 (1973)).
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cise treaty rights that their ancestors reserved long ago."77 Moreover,

"a measured Indian 'take' is allowed [from off-reservation hunting and

fishing] to provide reservation Indians with a 'moderate living.' "78
Regardless of whether a treaty contains an express provision that the

tribe seeks to retain off-reservation hunting and fishing rights, some

courts have found an implied reservation of those rights. 79 For example, in State v. Clark,8 0 the Minnesota Supreme Court held that "it
would be incongruous to construe the treaty as denying the Indians
their very means of existence while purporting to give them a home"
when analyzing a treaty that failed to expressly retain off-reservation
hunting and fishing rights.81 Once a court determines that express or
implied off-reservation hunting and fishing rights have been retained,

these rights then receive federal protection.8 2
2.

Recognition of Tribal Sovereignty

Federal recognition of a tribe's sovereign power to regulate tribal
members and tribal lands confirms the federal government's commitment to protect this inherent power.83 However, the "[r] ecognition of
broad tribal powers over hunting and fishing in no way implies an unlimited tribal right to disregard important state and federal interests in
77. Miller, supra note 69, at 1293 (citing Tulee v. Washington, 315 U.S. 681, 685
(1942)). See generally DAVID H. GETCHES & CHARLES F. WILKINSON, FEDERAL INDIAN LAW
716-72 (2d. ed. 1986).
78. Miller, supra note 69, at 1293 (citing Washington v. Washington State Commercial Passenger Fishing Vessel Ass'n, 443 U.S. 658, 686 (1979)). "The federal district
court in Washington State held that treaty language allowing Indians to fish 'in common with citizens of the United States' means the tribes can take fifty percent of the
harvest of anadromous fish in the Columbia River and Puget Sound." Id. (citing the
Treaty with the Walla, Cayuse, and Umatilla, June 9, 1855, art. I, 12 Stat. 945, 946,
reptinted in,
2 CHARLESJ. KAPPLER, INDIAN AFFAIRS: LAWS AND TREATIES 694, 695 (1904)).
See also United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312, 343 (W.D. Wash. 1974), aff'd,
520 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1086, reh'g denied, 424 U.S. 978 (1976)
(holding that fish taken for personal subsistence should not be counted toward the
share of fish allotted pursuant to the treaty).
79. See, e.g., State v. Lowe, 327 N.W.2d 166, 169 (Wis. Ct. App. 1982) (finding an
adequate expression of intent to reserve off-reservation fishing rights due to evidence
that the tribe historically had fished in the waters and that the reason the United States
purchased the land for a reservation was because of the importance of tribal fishing).
See also State v. Clark, 282 N.W.2d 902, 908-09 (Minn. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 904
(1980) (holding that the Chippewa reacquired hunting and fishing rights due to their
interpretation of the treaty and conduct in accordance with the treaty).
80. 282 N.W.2d 902 (Minn. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 904 (1980).
81. Id. at 909.
82. See generally HALL, supra note 54, at 14 (discussing the duty to help protect and
manage Indian trust property).
83. Reynolds, supra note 67, at 766. Federal recognition may be derived from "explicit treaty language granting off or on-reservation rights, from reasonable implications of the federal purpose revealed by the creation of the reservation itself, or from
general federal legislation." Id.
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the preservation of game and wildlife."84 Consequently, tribal sover-

eignty can be limited by federal legislationS5 or, in some instances,
state legislation. 8 6
Although the Constitution guarantees that Indian treaty rights generally preempt state regulation,8 7 courts have held in some instances
that state conservation laws similar to Indian tribal regulations are enforceable against tribal members.8 8 Nevertheless, federal recognition

of a tribe's authority to regulate the hunting and fishing activities of
tribal members on tribal lands supports the position that tribal sovereignty can be limited only if overriding state or federal interests are
clearly established.89
C. State Regulation
1.

Origin

State regulation of hunting and fishing is generally permissible to
90
Although a
the extent it promotes a valid police power objective.
state has no ownership interest in the fish and game within a state's
borders, the United States Supreme Court has repeatedly recognized
legitimate state interests in the conservation and protection of
wildlife.91
84. Id.
85. Id. "Although federal power to regulate any aspect of Indian affairs is undisputed, a court will require a clear expression of congressional intent to apply a particular statute to areas otherwise within the retained sovereign power of the tribe." Id. at
n.150 (citing United States v.Jackson, 600 F.2d 1283 (9th Cir. 1979)).
86. See generally Reynolds, supra note 67, at 766.

87. See U.S. CONST. art. VI, supra note 19. A state regulation will be upheld against
tribal members if the state can establish that the regulation is necessary for conservation, is the least restrictive alternative available, and does not discriminate against Indians. See infra part III.C.2.
88. See, e.g., United States v. Williams, 898 F.2d 727, 729-30 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that an Indian tribe member violated a state conservation act similar to the tribe's
hunting and fishing treaty rights).
89. Reynolds, supra note 67, at 766.
90. "The state has police power to regulate off reservation fishing only to the extent
reasonable and necessary for conservation of the resource .... Additionally, state regulation must not discriminate against the Indians...." United States v. Washington, 384
F. Supp. 312, 333 (W.D. Wash. 1974), aff'd, 520 F.2d 676 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 1086, reh'g denied, 424 U.S. 978 (1976).
91. See Douglas v. Seacoast Prods., Inc., 431 U.S. 265, 284 (1977) (stating that
"[n] either the States nor the Federal Government, any more than a hopeful fisherman
or hunter, has title to these creatures until they are reduced to possession by skillful
capture"). See also Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 337-38 (1979) (requiring that
the State's legitimate conservation interests not conflict with interstate commerce);
Baldwin v. Montana Fish & Game Comm'n, 436 U.S. 371, 385 (1978) (stating that "the
Court has recognized that the States' interest in regulating and controlling those things
they claim to 'own,' including wildlife, is by no means absolute").
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However, a state's broad powers to regulate hunting and fishing are
limited by the obligation to recognize treaty rights. State regulation
resulting in non-Indian hunting and fishing that infringes on reserved
treaty rights by making the exercise of these rights impossible consti92
tutes an invalid infringement on a federal right.
Nevertheless, "the Constitution is silent concerning whether states
have any authority to regulate [on Indian reservations]."9s In Worcester
v. Georgia,9 4 Chief Justice Marshall attempted to assign exclusive authority to regulate the Indian tribes to the federal government. 9 5 However, " [a] century and a half later, this flat prohibition against unilateral
6
state assertions of authority has eroded."9
For example, two more recent Supreme Court decisions involving
trout and salmon fishing disputes concluded that state regulations can
apply to on-reservation activity. In Puyallup Tribe v. Department of Game
of Washington,97 the Court explicitly rejected a claim of exclusive right
to all fish passing through the tribe's reservation. 9 8 Also, in Washington
v. Washington State Commercial PassengerFishing Vessel Association,99 the
Court found that the place where fish are taken was irrelevant to the
apportionment between treaty and non-treaty fishermen.10 0 Indian
tribes, therefore, arguably do not have sovereign power for all
purposes.
92. Washington, 384 F. Supp. at 407 (holding that "[b]ecause the right of each
United States, that

Treaty Tribe to take anadromous fish arises from a treaty with the

right is preserved and protected under the supreme law of the land, does not depend
on State law, is distinct from rights or privileges held by others, and may not be qualified by any action of the State"). See also United States v. Washington, 694 F.2d 1374,
1380-82 (9th Cir. 1982), vacated, op. replaced on reh'g 759 F.2d 1353 (9th Cir.), cert.
denied, 474 U.S. 994 (1985) (finding that "Indians' right of access to accustomed fishing
places may not be impaired"); Sohappy v. Smith, 302 F. Supp. 899, 911 (D. Or. 1969)

(stating that "the protection of the treaty right to take fish at the Indians' usual and
accustomed places must be an objective of the state's regulatory policy co-equal with the
conservation of fish runs for other users").
93. Frickey, supra note 39, at 1168. "The only provision in the Constitution expressly governing the allocation of power to deal with Indians is the Indian commerce
clause ... which provides that Congress has the authority to 'regulate Commerce with
foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes.'" Id. at
1168-69 n.179 (citing U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3).
94. 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515 (1832).
95. Frickey, supra note 39, at 1168-69. ChiefJustice Marshall described an Indian
reservation as "a distinct community occupying its own territory.., in which the laws of
[the state] can have no force." Worcester, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) at 561.
96. Frickey, supra note 39, at 1169.
97. 433 U.S. 165 (1977).
98. Id. at 173-77.
99. 443 U.S. 658 (1979).
100. Id. at 687-88.
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2. Limits on State Regulation
Although states have a strong interest in regulating the fish and wildlife within their borders, several obstacles restrict the exercise of this
authority over off-reservation Indian hunting and fishing.'0t The primary obstacle is the Supremacy Clause,' 0 2 which provides that a state's
regulatory authority is preempted by federal statute or treaty.0s "The
[S]upremacy [C]lause, when coupled with the fact that only Congress
can abrogate or modify treaties, seems to indicate that states have es104
sentially no power to regulate treaty-based hunting or fishing."
However, courts have held that unless federal law provides otherwise, states can subject Indian off-reservation hunting and fishing to
nondiscriminatory regulations.1 05 The Supreme Court has concluded
that a state may regulate in the interest of conservation provided that
the regulation meets two requirements: (1) the regulation must be a
"reasonable and necessary conservation measure," and (2) application
6
to the Indians must be "necessary in the interest of conservation."10
To fulfill the first requirement, a state must show that the regulation
is necessary to ensure the continued existence of the resource.10 7 As a
result, if a tribe is able to establish that the tribe is already adequately
regulating tribal members to ensure preservation of the resource, then
the state regulation of that particular resource will be deemed
unnecessary. 108
The second requirement has been interpreted as imposing a "least
restrictive alternative" requirement on the regulation of treaty
rights.109 This element requires the state police power to first be exercised over non-Indian citizens to achieve the conservation goal.11 0 In
summary, these two requirements impose strict limits on the state's
ability to regulate off-reservation hunting and fishing rights in the interest of conservation.
101. Nye, supra note 16, at 181.
102. U.S. CoNST. art. VI, cl. 2.
103. Nye, supra note 16, at 181. "The pre-emption doctrine, together with a weighing of state, tribal and federal interests, is the primary tool used by courts to decide
jurisdictional issues on Indian reservations." Id. at 181 n.51 (citing White Mountain
Apache Tribe v. Bracker, 448 U.S. 136, 142-43 (1980)).
104. Id. at 181.
105. See, e.g., Mescalero v. Jones, 411 U.S. 145, 148-49 (1973). See also Russ v. Wilkins, 624 F.2d 914 (9th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S. 908 (1981); United States v.
Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312, 408-09 (W.D. Wash.), aff'd, 520 F.2d 676 (9th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1086, reh'g denied, 424 U.S. 978 (1976).
106. Antoine v. Washington, 420 U.S. 194, 207 (1975).
107. Puyallup Tribe v. Department of Game of Wash., 391 U.S. 392, 401-02 (1968),
reh'g denied, 393 U.S. 898 (1968).

108. Washington, 384 F. Supp. at 340.
109. See United States v. Michigan, 653 F.2d 277, 279 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S.
1124 (1981).
110. Washington, 384 F. Supp. at 407.
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BRIEF REVIEW OF THE EVOLUTION OF FEDERAL INDIAN POLICY

Federal Indian policy has been marked by inconsistent objectives
and numerous shifts over the past century. At times, the primary objective has been to promote assimilation of Native Americans into
American society. At other times, however, the objective has been to
protect the autonomy of Native Americans.
A.

Indian Reorganization Act of 1934

One example of federal policy, the Indian Reorganization Act,"'1
was enacted in 1934 during a period in which Federal Indian policy
sought to protect the autonomy of Native Americans by promoting tribal self-governance.112 To aid in self-governance, the Act gave tribes
the power to adopt constitutions and bylaws that became effective
upon ratification by tribal members and approval by the Secretary of
the Interior. 1l3 This Act was a concerted effort by Congress to
strengthen, rather than destroy, the Federal-Indian relationship.
B.

Termination

Federal Indian policy took a dramatic turn approximately twenty
years after the enactment of the Indian Reorganization Act. In an effort to assimilate Indians into mainstream America, Congress enacted
legislation specifically intended to dissolve the unique relationship between the Indians and the federal government. Termination was officially adopted as Federal Indian policy when Congress passed House
Concurrent Resolution 108 in 1953.114 This resolution stated in part:
Whereas it is the policy of Congress, as rapidly as possible, to make
the Indians ... subject to the same laws and entitled to the same
privileges and responsibilities as are applicable to other citizens of
the United States, to end their status as wards of the United States
and to grant them all the rights and prerogatives pertaining to American citizenship; and
Whereas the Indians ... should assume their full responsibilities as
American citizens: Now, therefore, be it Resolved by the House of
111. 25 U.S.C. §§ 461-479 (1988).
112. The Indian Reorganization Act of 1934 has been referred to as "perhaps the
most fundamental and far-reaching piece of legislation passed by Congress in this century." DELORIA, supra note 13, at 187.

113. Section 16 of the Act provides in part:
Any Indian tribe, shall have the right to organize for its common welfare, and
may adopt an appropriate constitution and bylaws and any amendments
thereto which shall become , effective when (1) ratified by a majority vote of
the adult members of the tribe, or tribes, at a special election authorized
and called by the Secretary under such rules and regulations as the Secretary may prescribe [and] (2) approved by the Secretary pursuant to subsection (d).
25 U.S.C. § 476 (1988).
114. H.R. Con. Res. 108, 83rd Cong., 1st Sess., 67 Stat. B132 (1953).
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Representatives (The Senate concurring) that... at the earliest possible time, all of the Indian tribes and individual members thereof
located within the States of California, Florida, New York, and Texas
...
should be freed from Federal supervision and control and from
all disabilities and limitations specially applicable to Indians ....
It is further declared to be the sense of Congress that, upon release
of such tribes and individual members thereof from such disabilities
and limitations, all offices of the Bureau of Indian Affairs ... whose
primary purpose was to serve any Indian tribe or individual Indian
15
freed from federal supervision should be abolished.1
Congress rationalized this termination policy as a means of "freeing"
Indians from federal control and granting them full citizenship
rights.l16 However, for those Indians affected, this policy actually resulted in abrogation of treaty rights, harassment by state and local governments, and, for some, near economic and social disaster.Xl7
The termination policy expressed in Resolution 108 was implemented through the passage of Public Law 280.118 Public Law 280
modified certain aspects of the relationship between the United States
and affected Indian tribes by granting certain states"19 the power to
exercise civil and criminal jurisdiction over particular Indian tribes.120
The Act shifted the balance of jurisdictional power toward the states
and away from the federal government and Indian tribes. However,
the Act neither granted the states total jurisdictional power nor terminated the federal trust relationship that existed between the federal
government and Indian tribes.i21 The Act also prohibited states from
115. Id.
116. See generally Carole E. Goldberg, Public Law 280: The Limits of State Jurisdiction
over Reservation Indians, 22 U.C.L.A. L. REv. 535, 540-45 (1975) (discussing legislative
background to Public Law 280's adoption).
117. For a detailed discussion of termination, see Charles F. Wilkinson and Eric R.
Biggs, The Evolution of the Termination Policy, 5 AM. INDLAN L. REv. 139 (1977).
118. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-280, 67 Stat. 588 (1953) (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1162; 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1988)).
119. The original states were California, Minnesota (except for the Red Lake Reservation), Nebraska, Oregon, and Wisconsin (except for the Menominee reservation).
However, the Menominees were added to the list in 1954. See 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3171.
In addition, Alaska was added in 1958. See 1958 U.S.C.C.A.N 3347. Public Law 280 also
gave power to other states to assume legislatively enacted jurisdiction. Pub. L. No.
83-280, ch. 505, § 7, 67 Stat. 588, 590 (1953) (current version at 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321 (a),
1322(a) (1988) (authorizing a state to assume jurisdiction over Indian lands only with
the tribe's permission)).
120. Pub. L. No. 83-280, 67 Stat. 588 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 1162; 28
U.S.C. 1360 (1988)).
121. California ex rel. Cal. Dep't of Fish & Game v. Quechan Tribe, 595 F.2d 1153,
1156 (9th Cir. 1979) (holding that tribe's sovereign immunity barred lawsuit by state to
enforce fishing and game laws against non-Indians on reservations). Public Law 280
states:
Nothing in this act shall authorize the: alienation, encumbrance or taxation of
any real or personal property, including water rights, belonging to any Indian
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interfering with Indian hunting and fishing rights or deciding ques122
tions of ownership of trust property.
In 1976, the United States Supreme Court clarified the limits of this
Act by declaring as invalid state attempts to tax Indians and control
their activities on the reservations.1 23 In Bryan v. Itasca County,124 a
Minnesota county assessed a personal property tax on an Indian-owned
trailer home located on an Indian reservation.1 25 The county maintained that the tax was valid because the land was not being taxed.l26
The Minnesota Supreme Court agreed and allowed the tax.1 2 7 On appeal, the United States Supreme Court reversed the decision on the
basis that the tax was a regulatory scheme that was beyond the scope of
Public Law 280.128
Writing for the majority, Justice Brennan found that the primary
purpose of Public Law 280 was to extend the state's jurisdictional
bounds only in criminal and civil cases and that the Act was not intended to effect the total assimilation of Indian tribes.129 To the contrary, Justice Brennan concluded that the Act should be construed
narrowly to apply only to questions ofjurisdiction.lSO Thus, any state
attempts to exert power through a regulatory scheme were clearly
outside the scope of the Act.13l
C.

Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968

Federal Indian policy took another significant shift in focus with the
passage of the Indian Civil Rights Act of 1968.132 This Act amended
Public Law 280 so that states were now required to obtain consent
from affected tribes prior to exercising jurisdiction over the Indian
lands.1 33 This Act also included provisions requiring that all Indian
tribes, in exercising their self-governing powers, observe and protect
or Indian tribe, band or community that is held in trust by the United States
or is subject to a restriction against alienation imposed by the United States; or
shall authorize regulation or the use of such property in a manner inconsistent with any federal treaty, agreement or statute or with any regulation made
pursuant thereto ....
25 U.S.C. § 1321(b) (1988).
122. 28 U.S.C. § 1360(b) (1988).
123. Bryan v. Itasca County, 426 U.S. 373, 379 (1976).
124. 303 Minn. 395, 228 N.W.2d 249 (1975), rev'd, 426 U.S. 373 (1976).
125. Id. at 396-97, 228 N.W.2d at 251.
126. Id. at 397, 228 N.W.2d at 251.
127. Id. at 407, 228 N.W.2d at 256.
128. Bryan, 426 U.S. at 378-79.
129. Id. at 387.
130. Id. at 388.
131. Id. at 384.
132. Act of Apr. 11, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-284, 82 Stat. 77 (1968) (codified in part at
25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1322, 1326 (1988)).
133. 25 U.S.C. §§ 1321-22, 1326 (1988). However, the Act did not affect the six
original states' jurisdictional control over Indian affairs. Id. at § 1326.
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the freedom of speech, freedom of religion, due process, and equal
protection of the laws.134
This renewed focus on tribal sovereignty became clearer in 1970. At
that time, President Nixon declared an end to the Federal Indian termination policy and notified Congress that he intended to protect the
Indian lands by transferring control of Indian programs from federal
35
to tribal governments.1
These are but a few examples of legislative and executive pronouncements concerning the federal government's Indian policy
throughout the 1900s. As indicated, the government's objectives regarding the Indian peoples have been the subject of frequent change,
which has resulted in an inconsistent and unpredictable federal policy.
V.

THE CHIPPEWA TREATIES AND THE PRESIDENTIAL REMOVAL

ORDER OF 1850
A.

Treaty of 1837

In 1837, Wisconsin Territorial Governor, Henry Dodge, entered into
treaty negotiations with the Chippewa Indian tribes for the purchase of
land in what is now eastern-central Minnesota and northern Wisconsin.136 The initial government objective in purchasing this land was to
acquire timber and make way for settlers.137 However, the government's long term goal was to remove the tribes from the area.13 8
On July 29, 1837, "at a council near Fort Snelling at the mouth of
the St. Peter's River, the Chippewa .. .ceded thousands of square
miles of timber land in the St. Croix watershed of Minnesota and Wisconsin."1 9 The Chippewa tribes were offered and accepted $9,500
dollars cash, $19,000 worth of goods, $3000 worth of supplies to establish blacksmith shops, $1000 for farmers, $2000 worth of provisions,
and $500 worth of tobacco in exchange for relinquishing control of
their land and timber.140
134. 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (1988).

135. ROBERT N. CLINTON ET AL., AMERICAN INDIAN LAW: CASES AND MATERIALS 160
(3d ed. 1991) (citing Message from the President of the United States Transmitting
Recommendations for Indian Policy, H.R. Doc. No. 363, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970)).
136. 1837 Treaty, supra note 4.
137. Robert H. Keller, The Chippewa Treaties of 1842 and 1854, 9, No. 4 AM. INDIANJ.
10, 10 (1987).
138. Id. "Removal was deemed necessary because of the increasing pressure by
Euroamericans on, principally, tribal lands in the South and Southeast and because of
increasingly bitter federal-state jurisdiction conflicts related to Indian lands." CONFERENCE OF WESTERN ATTORNEYS GENERAL, AMERICAN INDIAN LAW DESKBOOK 13 (1993) (citing FRANCIS P. PRUCHA, THE GREAT FATHER 195-200 (1984)).
139. See Keller, supra note 137, at 11.
140. 1837 Treaty, supra note 4, at 67-69.
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Many of the tribes would have allowed timber and other resource
removal without payment, but wished to keep the land and the tribes'
right to traditional uses of that land.141 To protect their right to use
the land, tribal leaders demanded guarantees that they be permitted to
continue to hunt, fish, and gather wild rice (the first recognition of
that right in a Chippewa treaty4 2) on the ceded territory.143
At the negotiations, Aish-ke-bo-ge-koshe,'44 an Indian chief from
Leech Lake, stated: "Your children are willing to let you have their
lands, but they wish to reserve the privilege of making sugar from the
trees, and getting their living from the lakes and rivers, as they have
done heretofore, and of remaining in the country."'14 5 Henry Dodge
replied: "I will make known to your Great Father [the President of the
United States], your request to be permitted to make sugar, on the
lands; and you will be allowed, during. his pleasure, to hunt and fish on
them. It will probably be many years before your Great Father will
want all these lands for the use of his White Children."146
The United States agreed to these demands, and the privileges were
47
reserved in Article Five of the treaty.'
B.

Treaty of 1842

In 1842, the United States entered into a second treaty with the
Chippewa tribe. 148 Again, the government's primary objective was to
141. Keller, supra note 137, at 11.
142. Id.

143. Nelson, supra note 35, at 384.
144. Aish-ke-bo-ge-koshe, or Flat Mouth, was one of 51 Chippewa chiefs and warors
who signed the 1837 Treaty with the government. See Charles F. Wilkinson, To Feel The
Summer in the Spring: The Treaty Fishing Rights of the Wisconsin Chippewa, 1991 Wis. L. REv.
375, 387 (1991).
145. Aish-ke-bo-ge-koshe's speech was recorded by the secretary of the 1837 treaty
council, Verplanck Van Antwerp. Wilkinson, supra note 144, at 387 n.59 (citing United
States v. Bouchard, 464 F. Supp. 1316, 1323 (W.D. Wis. 1978)).
146. See Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Chippewa v. Voigt, 700 F.2d 341, 344 (7th Cir.
1983), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 805 (1983).
147. Article Five states: "The privilege of hunting, fishing, and gathering the wild
rice, upon the rivers and the lakes included in the territory ceded, is guarantied (sic) to
the Indians, during the pleasure of the United States President." 1837 Treaty, supra
note 4, at 67-69. "The word ('reserved'] is emphasized because it is one of the most
fundamental of Indian law principles. The reserved rights doctrine recognizes that
treaty rights are not gifts to Indians, but rather terms bargained for between sovereign
nations. Whatever rights are not negotiated away from the tribes are retained or reserved by them." Nelson, supra note 35, at n.28 (citing United States v. Winans, 198
U.S. 371, 381 (1905)).
148. Treaty with the Chippewa, Oct. 4, 1842, U.S.-Chippewa, 7 Stat. 591, reprinted in
INsTrrTUE FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF INDIAN LAW, TREATIES & AGREEMENTS OF THE CHIPPEWA INDIANs, 73-75 (1974) ("1842 Treaty").
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accumulate land for impending population expansion.149 Similar to
the 1837 treaty, the 1842 treaty also contained a provision reserving
off-reservation hunting, fishing, and gathering rights for the Chippewa
until the President required removal of the tribe) 50
C.

Removal Order of 1850

Accepting the recommendations of the Commissioner of Indian Affairs and the Legislative Assembly of the Minnesota Territory, President Zachary Taylor issued an executive order on February 6, 1850
that removed the Chippewa Indians from the territories ceded in the
1837 and 1842 treaties.15

"The Indians were surprised and dismayed by the [removal] order,"152 because they were under the impression that they would only
be removed for misbehavior and there was no evidence of misbehavior.1 5 3 "At the time the Order was issued, [the Mille Lacs Band of

Chippewa] peaceably occupied lands and waters that were forty to fifty
miles from the nearest white settlement, and had given no offense that
might conceivably have justified the Removal Order."15 4 In fact, the
1854 Wisconsin Legislature stated in a letter to the President and Congress requesting the rescission of the removal order that the Chippewa
Indians were a "peaceable, quiet, and inoffensive people."155
The removal order was allegedly countermanded by President Fillmore after several Chippewa Chiefs went to Washington in April
1852.156 Unfortunately, no record of the countermand currently
exists.157
149. Nelson, supra note 35, at 384 (citing Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Chippewa v.
Voigt, 700 F.2d 341, 345 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 805 (1983)).
150. 1842 Treaty, supra note 148, at 73-75 (stating "the Indians stipulate for the
right of hunting on the ceded territory, with the other usual privileges of occupancy,
until required to remove by the President of the United States, . .").
151. Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Chippewa v. Voigt, 700 F.2d 344, 346 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 464 U.S. 805 (1983). President Taylor's removal order provided:
The privileges granted temporarily to the Chippewa Indians of Mississippi by
[the Treaty of 1837, art. 5] ... and the rights granted to the Chippewa Indians
of the Mississippi and Lake Superior by the second article of the treaty with
them of October 4th, 1842... are hereby revoked and all of the said Indians on
the lands ceded as aforesaid, are required to remove to the unceded lands.
Id. (emphasis added).
152. Id. at 346.
153. Id. at 346-47.
154. Plaintiff's Memorandum in Support of Partial Summary Judgment Dismissing
ICCA and Indispensable Party Defenses at 8, Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa v. Minnesota, Civ. No. 4-90-605 (D. Minn. Aug. 13, 1990).
155. Voig, 700 F.2d at 348.
156. Id. at 347.
157. Id. at 348.
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Treaty of 1854

On September 30, 1854, the Treaty of La Pointe was negotiated between the Lake Superior Chippewa tribes and the United States government.15 8 The Chippewa tribe "sold their claims to land in northern
Minnesota... in exchange for reservations within the 1837 and 1842
ceded territories, over which they would have exclusive control." 159
Similar to the 1837 and 1842 treaties, this treaty also expressly reserved off-reservation hunting and fishing rights for tribe members.160
Article Eleven of the 1854 treaty provides: "And such [Indians] as reside
in the territory hereby ceded, shall have the right to hunt and fish
therein, until otherwise ordered by the President."' 6 ' This treaty, however, did not make any mention of the hunting, fishing, and gathering
rights of the Chippewa Indians residing in the 1837 and 1842 ceded
territories.162

E. Treaty of 1855
On February 22, 1855, the Mississippi, Pillager, and Lake Winnibigoshish Bands of Chippewa, including the Mille Lacs Band, entered into another treaty with the United States government.' 6 3
Unlike the 1837, 1842, and 1854 treaties, the 1855 treaty did not reserve any hunting, fishing, and gathering rights on the ceded territory
for the Indians. Article Two of the 1855 treaty established the boundaries of new reservations, including a reservation for the Mille Lacs
Band within the 1837 ceded territory. 164
Perhaps the most significant article of the 1855 treaty is Article One
which provides in part: "And the said Indians do further fully and entirely relinquish and convey to the United States, any and all right,
title, and interest, of whatsoever nature the same may be, which they
158. Treaty with the Chippewa, Sept. 30, 1854, U.S.-Chippewa, 10 Stat. 1109, reprinted in INsTrruTE FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF INDIAN LAW, TREATIES & AGREEMENTS OF
THE CHIPPEWA INDIANS, 78-82 (1974) ("1854 Treaty").
159. Nelson, supra note 35, at 386 (citing United States v. Bouchard, 464 F. Supp.
1316, 1370-71 (W.D. Wis. 1978)).
160. Compare 1837 Treaty, supra note 4, at 67 and 1842 Treaty, supra note 148, at 73
with 1854 Treaty, supra note 158, at 78. See also State v. Gurnoe, 192 N.W.2d 892, 901
(Wis. 1971) (finding that the Indians had a right to fish on Lake Superior, since they
would have assumed when they signed the 1854 treaty that "the right to fish" was not
limited to the waters on the reservation).
161. See 1854 Treaty, supra note 158, at 78-82.
162. See Nelson, supra note 35, at 386. See also 1854 Treaty, supra note 158, at 78-82.
163. Treaty with the Chippewa, Feb. 22, 1855, U.S.-Chippewa, 10 Stat. 1165, reprinted
in INSTITUTE FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF INDIAN LAW, TREATIES & AGREEMENTS OF THE

CHIPPEWA INDIANS, 83-84 (1974) ("1855 Treaty").
164. 1855 Treaty, supra note 163, at 83-84.
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may now have in, and to any other lands in the Territory of Minnesota
6
or elsewhere."1 5
F. JudicialInterpretation of Rights Granted Under the Chippewa Treaties
The question of whether the hunting, fishing, and gathering rights
reserved in the 1837 and 1842 treaties were terminated by the 1850
removal order or the 1854 treaty was resolved by the Seventh Circuit
Court of Appeals in Lac Courte OreillesBand of Chippewa v. Voigt.l 6 6 The
Voigt court concluded that the guarantees reserved in the 1837 and
67
1842 treaties remained valid and enforceable.1
First, the court found that the 1850 removal order was illegal168 because Congress had plenary power over Indian affairs and the President could not exceed the power delegated to him by Congress by use
of an executive order.16 9 The court held that President Taylor's authority to remove the Indians was limited by Congress's plenary
power1 70 and by the Indians' own understanding of the treaty's
terms.17 1 The court based this decision on the special canons of construction that require courts to consider the Indians' understanding of
the treaty.172
On the basis of treaty construction, the court found that the tribe
believed that removal from the ceded territories would occur only if
the tribe misbehaved by causing hostilities with the settlers.173 Thus,
because the court did not find any evidence indicating that the Indians
7
had actually misbehaved, the removal order was held to be illegal.1 4
Second, the court found that the off-reservation hunting, fishing,
and gathering rights reserved in the 1837 and 1842 treaties were not
165. Id. at 83. This article was used by the State to support the claim that the hunting, fishing, and gathering rights granted to the Mille Lacs Band in the 1837 treaty were
terminated. See generally Defendant's Memorandum in Support of Cross-Motion for
Summary Judgment and in Response to Plaintiff's 2nd & 3rd Partial Summary Judgment Motions, at 9, Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa v. Minnesota, Civ. No. 4-90-605 (D.
Minn. Aug. 13, 1990) ("Defendant's Cross-Motion").
166. 700 F.2d 341 (7th Cir. 1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 805 (1983). The Wisconsin
Band of Lake Superior Chippewa were not signatories to the 1855 treaty, therefore that
treaty was not at issue in the Voigt case. Defendant's Cross-Motion, supra note 165, at 9
n.4.

167. Voigh, 700 F.2d 341 at 365 (concluding that to determine the validity of the
1850 removal order required a finding of whether the Indian tribe members
misbehaved).
168. Id. at 362.
169. Nelson, supra note 35, at 387 (citing 700 F.2d at 361).
170. Voigt, 700 F.2d at 361.
171. Id. at 351.
172. See supra part II.B for a discussion of these special canons of construction.
173. Voigt, 700 F.2d at 361.
174. Id. at 362.
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terminated by the 1854 treaty.' 75 The Voigt court "reasoned that
although Article Eleven [of the 1854 treaty] explicitly reserved these
rights for Indians living in the 1854 ceded territories, the failure to
reserve the rights for Indians living in the 1837 and 1842 ceded territories were not terminated, because the evidence was ambiguous at
76
best."'1
The Voigt court found that the Indians had not understood at the
time of the 1854 treaty negotiations that they were terminating their
hunting, fishing, and gathering rights in exchange for the reservations. 177 Consequently, all Indians subject to the 1837 and 1842 trea78
ties maintained their reserved rights to hunt, fish, and gather.'
VI.

CURRENT CONTROVERSY OVER THE TREATY OF 1837

The Treaty of 1837 included territory covering parts of what is presently twelve counties in east-central Minnesota.' 79 This area includes
Lake Mille Lacs, a popular sport fishing destination.' 8 0 The Mille Lacs
Band of Chippewa is currently defending the rights retained under
Article Five of the 1837 treaty. This Article expressly preserves the
Band's right to hunt, fish, and gather wild rice in these twelve counties
without interference from the State. 18 ' The Band contends that these
reserved rights include the netting and spearing of game fish during
82
spawning, acts that are illegal under Minnesota law.'
In 1990, the Band sued the Minnesota Department of Natural Resources ("DNR") to prevent enforcement of state fish and game regulations against Band members in the twelve counties.18s To avoid
litigation, the DNR and the Band agreed to a compromise creating a
tribal fishing zone in 4.5% of Lake Mille Lacs where the Indians could
175. Id. at 364.

176. Nelson, supra note 35, at 387.
177. Id. at 387 n.51 (citing 700 F.2d at 363).
178. Voigt 700 F.2d at 365.

179. The territory ceded by the Chippewa tribes in the 1837 treaty consisted of an
area south and southeast of the Mille Lacs Reservation and includes part or all of
Anoka, Aitkin, Crow Wing, Kanebec, Isanti, Morrison, Mille Lacs, Pine, Benton,
Sherburne, and Chisago counties and other land. United States Complaint in Intervention at 2, Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa v. Minnesota, Civ. No. 4-90-605 (D. Minn. Aug.
13, 1990).
180. Pat Doyle, U.S. Seeks to Join Lawsuit to Back Indians on Treaty, STARTRIB. (Mpls.),
Sept. 3, 1993, at 16A (noting that Lake Mille Lacs is the "most popular destination for
Twin Cities sport anglers").
181. Complaint at 10, Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa v. Minnesota, Civ. No. 4-90-605
(D. Minn. Aug. 13, 1990).
182. Id. See also MINN. STAT. chapters 97A, 97B, 97C (1992 & Supp. 1993) (regulating sport hunting and fishing in Minnesota).
183. Complaint, supra note 181, at 4. See also Pat Doyle, supra note 180, at 16A. See
generally MINN. STAT. chapters 97A, 97B, 97C (1992 & Supp. 1993).

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1994

25

1202

William Mitchell
Law Review, Vol. 20, Iss. 4 [1994], Art. 8
1WL/_AM MITCHELL LAW REV!EW

[Vol. 20

net or spear fish.184 The DNR also agreed to provide the Band with
7500 acres of public land, up to $10 million, and other concessions.18 5
In order to prevail, the proposed settlement required the approval
of the Minnesota Legislature and the concurrence of the Band.1 86
However, the bill was defeated twice in the Legislature and has been
said to have been the victim of legislative politics, divided leadership,
and racism.' 8 7 This legislative rejection led to the Band's decision to
file suit against the State in federal court. The Band's objective was a
judicial solution regarding the enforcement of treaty rights for off-res88
ervation hunting and fishing in the ceded territory.'
Two days after the treaty settlement was rejected, the Minnesota Legislature appropriated $1 million to underwrite the initial costs of defending the Band's lawsuit.189 The State, however, appeared to be
underestimating the cost of litigating this issue given that the State of
Wisconsin expended $12 million and fourteen years litigating similar
claims by other bands under the same treaty. 190

The Legislature's failure to approve the treaty settlement resulted in
significant consequences, both current and future. First, if successful
at trial, the Band could be awarded the right to take up to fifty percent
of the fish in Lake Mille Lacs and the surrounding ceded territories. 19 1
In a similar treaty dispute, a Wisconsin tribe won the right to take up to
fifty percent of the fish in
92
Wisconsin.1

the northern

third of the state of

184. Doyle, supra note 180, at 16A.
185. Id.
186. See generally Robert Whereatt, supra note 1, at lB.
187. Id.
188. Complaint, supra note 181, at 9-10.
189. Mordecai Specktor, State Will Waste Millions in Vain Fight to Squelch Treaty Rights,
STARTRIB. (Mpls.), May 31, 1993, at 11A.
190. Id. See Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Chippewa v. Wisconsin, 760 F.2d 177 (7th
Cir. 1985); Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Chippewa v. Voigt, 700 F.2d 341 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 805 (1983); Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Chippewa v. Wisconsin, 758 F.
Supp. 1262 (W.D. Wis. 1991); Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Chippewa v. Wisconsin, 749
F. Supp. 913 (W.D. Wis. 1990); Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Chippewa v. Wisconsin 740
F. Supp. 1400 (W.D. Wis. 1990); Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Chippewa v. Wisconsin,
707 F. Supp. 1034 (W.D. Wis. 1989); Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Chippewa v. Wisconsin, 686 F. Supp. 226 (W.D. Wis. 1988); Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Chippewa v. Wisconsin, 668 F. Supp. 1233 (W.D. Wis. 1987); Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Chippewa v.
Wisconsin, 653 F. Supp. 1420 (W.D. Wis. 1987).
191. The district court could follow a similar action taken by the court in Lac Courte
Oreilles Band of Chippewa v. Wisconsin, 740 F. Supp. 1400 (W.D. Wis. 1990), which relied
on the holding in Washington v. Washington CommercialFishingPassengerVessel Association,
443 U.S. 658 (1979). See 740 F. Supp. at 1417-18. The Washington Court held that the
Indians were entitled to a fifty percent share of the harvestable run of fish. 443 U.S. at
686-88.
192. Lac Courte Oreilles, 740 F. Supp. at 1426.
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Second, the Legislature's failure to approve the settlement resulted
in the intervention of the United States Justice Department.193 This

time the Justice Department assumed "a far more active role than it
played in the fishing and hunting dispute involving the same 1837
treaty in Wisconsin."19 4 In Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Chippewa v.
Voigt,i 95 "the federal government merely filed a brief supporting the
Wisconsin Chippewa when their court victory was appealed, but the
Justice Department had not joined forces with the Chippewa during
the earlier trial."196
Because the federal government acts as trustee for Indian tribes,197
the United States argued that the federal government had a congressionally imposed responsibility to protect the interests of Indian
tribes. 198 Consequently, the Justice Department joined the Band in
the suit against the State because it believed the dispute involved issues
vital to the Band as well as Indian interests throughout the United
States. 199

However, federal intervention on the side of the Band did not occur
without protest by the State.2 00 The State urged the court to reject the
Justice Department's request for intervention, arguing that the federal
government has been inconsistent on the treaty issue. 2 0 ' The state
maintained that "now, because the current administration . .. has a
different view . .. it seems they are saying, '[w]e no longer have to
defend what has historically been our Indian policy.' "202 The state
contended that over the years the federal government embraced poli203
cies that nullified the Band's claims.
Nevertheless, the State's argument was defeated by counter arguments by the Justice Department and the Band. The Band argued that
"the federal government shouldn't be bound by any earlier federal pol193. United States' Notice of Motion and Motion to Intervene as Plaintiff, Mille Lacs
Band of Chippewa v. Minnesota, Civ. No. 4-90-605 (D. Minn. Aug. 13, 1990).
194. Doyle, supra note 180, at 16A.
195. 700 F.2d 341 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 805 (1983).
196. Doyle, supra note 180, at 16A. "[O]ne Indian official who has followed the Wisconsin and Minnesota cases said the Clinton Administration appears to be more willing
than the Reagan and Bush administrations to side with Indians in such disputes." Id.
197. See supra part III.A.2.
198. Pat Doyle, Attorneys Spar Over US. Policy on Tribal Rights; Government Bids to Intervene in Mile Lacs Fishing Case, STARTIB. (Mpls.), Oct. 20, 1993, at lB.
199. Doyle, supra note 180, at 16A.
200. See Defendant's Reply Memorandum in Opposition to United States Motion to
Intervene, Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa v. Minnesota, Civ. No. 4-90-605 (D. Minn.
Aug. 13, 1990).
201. Doyle, supra note 198, at lB.
202. Id. (quoting Michelle Beeman, Minnesota Assistant Attorney General defending the State).
203. Id. See supra part IV (discussing the evolution of Federal Indian policy).
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icies that subjected Indian tribes to state fish and game laws." 204 In
addition, the Band maintained that hunting and fishing laws have
changed in the last fifty years and the Mille Lacs dispute should be
based on current law.205 The motion to intervene was eventually
granted and the Justice Department was joined as a party to the
lawsuit.206

VII.

THE INITIAL ARGUMENTS ON TERMINATION OF THE BAND'S
RIGHTS AND AN ANALYSIS OF THEIR VIABILrrY

The Band and the State have both raised numerous issues and posited various arguments in support of their respective positions. Initially, the State raised a number of primary arguments for termination
of the Band's rights, including: 1) termination by reason of the 1850
removal order; 2) termination by reason of the 1855 treaty; 3) termination by reason of Federal Indian policy; and 4) termination for conservation purposes. Based on the facts of this case and prior outcomes in
similar legal disputes regarding states' rights to regulate off-reservation
hunting and fishing, 207 one may predict how the court was likely to
rule on this dispute.
A.

Termination by Reason of 1850 Removal Order

First, the court was not likely to support the State's claim that the
1837 treaty was abrogated by the 1850 removal order. 208 The State's
attempt to establish new facts in support of the argument that the removal order terminated off-reservation hunting and fishing guarantees
in the 1837 treaty is astonishing given that the State of Wisconsin failed
to find any such facts during the seventeen years that Wisconsin made
an identical, and unsuccessful, argument.2 09
Both the district and appellate court in Lac Courte Oreilles Band of
Chippewa v. Voigt2 1o found that the 1850 removal order by President
Taylor was illegal and did not terminate any rights guaranteed to the
Chippewa under the 1837 treaty.21 1 Those courts found that under
the special canons of construction, 21 2 the Indians involved in the 1837
204. Doyle, supra note 198, at lB (quoting Marc Slonim, a Band attorney).
205. Id.
206. Order for Intervention, Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa v. Minnesota, Civ. No.
4-90-605 (D. Minn. Aug. 13, 1990).
207. See, e.g., Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Chippewa v. Voigt, 700 F.2d 341 (7th
Cir.), cert.denied, 464 U.S. 805 (1983); Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Chippewa v. Wisconsin, 668 F. Supp. 1233 (W.D. Wis. 1987).
208. Defendant's Answer to United States' Complaint, at 2-4, Mille Lacs Band of
Chippewa v. Minnesota, Civ. No. 4-90-605 (D. Minn. Aug. 13, 1990).
209. Voigt, 700 F.2d at 362. See Specktor, supra note 189, at llk
210. 700 F.2d 341 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 805 (1983).
211. Id. at 362.
212. See supra part II.B (discussing the special canons of construction).
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and 1842 treaties understood that their off-reservation hunting and
fishing rights were reserved so long as they maintained good behavior. 2 13 While not binding precedent, the court was likely to give these
decisions strong consideration in making a determination on this
argument.
In addition to these prior decisions on the validity of the removal
order, the historical record alone supported a finding that the removal
order did not terminate the rights reserved in the 1837 treaty. To that
end, the Band contended that the 1850 removal order was never applied to the Mille Lacs Band, was abandoned in practice, and was nullified by later treaties that reserved to the Chippewas "permanent
21 4
homes" in the territories ceded in the 1837 treaty.
Furthermore, in Mole Lake Band v. United States,21 5 a decision addressing the issue of whether or not the 1850 removal order was valid,
"the United States stated that 'in its administrative interpretations' of
the effect of the 1850 Order 'the United States never considered that
the Indian rights were terminated thereby.' "216
B.

Termination by Reason of 1855 Treaty

The court was also not likely to uphold the State's argument that the
treaty of 1855217 terminated the Band's rights to hunt, fish, and gather
on the ceded territory under the 1837 treaty. 218 The State's argument
was invalid on the basis of the application of the canons of construction used to interpret Indian treaties. These canons require the court
to interpret the treaty of 1855 as the Chippewa Indians would have
understood the treaty at the time the treaty was negotiated. 2 19

These canons mandate that the court interpret the 1855 treaty so as
not to terminate any hunting, fishing, or gathering rights guaranteed
to the Band in the 1837 treaty. This conclusion is based on two factors.
One, there was no explicit statement in the treaty of 1855 that terminated the hunting, fishing, and gathering rights of the Chippewa in
213. United States Response to Defendant State's Memorandum in Support of
Cross-Motion for Summary Judgment at 3, Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa v. Minnesota,
Civ. No. 4-90-605 (D. Minn. Aug. 13, 1990).
214. Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Support of Partial Summary Judgment Dismissing
ICCA and Indispensable Party Defenses at 8, Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa v. Minnesota, Civ. No. 4-90-605 (D. Minn. Aug. 13, 1990).
215. 139 F. Supp. 938 (Ct. Cl.), cert.
denied, 352 U.S. 982 (1956).
216. See Plaintiffs' Response to Briefs Filed in Opposition to United States' Motion
to Intervene at 5, Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa v. Minnesota, Civ. No. 4-90-605 (D.

Minn. Aug. 13, 1990).
217. Defendant's Answer, supra note 208, at 4-5.
218. Id.
219. See supra part II.B.
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the 1837 ceded territory.220 Second, the Chippewa would not have
likely agreed to the treaty of 1855 if they understood that the treaty
would terminate these rights, as termination would have meant eliminating their primary means of survival.
C.

Abrogation by Reason of Federal Indian Policy

Third, the State was unlikely to be successful in arguing that the
1837 treaty was abrogated by subsequent federal government accords
and policies. 22 ' Public Law 280,222 established to implement the federal government's policy of terminating treaty rights during the 1950s,
is one example of subsequent federal response to Indian policy.
In spite of Public Law 280's perceived implementation of the federal
policy of termination, the Act did not, in fact, achieve this goal. The
Act expressly provides that nothing "shall deprive any Indian or any
Indian tribe, band, or community of any right, privilege, or immunity
afforded under Federal treaty, agreement, or statute with respect to
hunting, trapping, or fishing or the control, licensing, or regulation
thereof."223 This provision essentially leaves the State of Minnesota, as
one of the few states to have adopted Public Law 280, in the same
position with regard to treaty hunting and fishing rights as the State
occupied in the absence of Public Law 280.
Moreover, the federal government is reluctant to abrogate Indian
treaties to settle legal disputes. 22 4 However, regardless of the current
status of Federal Indian policy, the main consideration by the court
should be the fact that this policy is constantly in flux.225 In fact, the
only constant with regard to Federal Indian policy is the fact that the
policy is continually changing.226 Therefore, the State's claim that its
arguments are consistent with Federal Indian policy lacked merit due
2 27
to the fact that the policy itself has been inconsistent
220. Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Chippewa v. Voigt, 700 F.2d 341, 365 (7th Cir.),
cert.
denied, 464 U.S. 805 (1983) (stating that the extinguishment of treaty-recognized
rights by subsequent Congressional acts will be found only if it is clear that such termination was intended).
221. Defendant's Answer, supra note 208, at 9. "State Defendants allege that they
have acted in reliance on long standing policies and pronouncements of the United
States government in both its removal policy, legislation and its statements on extinguishment of rights under the 1837 Treaty and later treaties with the Chippewa Indians." Id.
222. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, Pub. L. No. 83-280, 67 Stat. 588, 589 (1953) (codified at
18 U.S.C. § 1162; 28 U.S.C. § 1360 (1988)).
223. Id.
224. Richard A. Finnigan, Comment, Indian Treaty Analysis and Off-Reservation Fishing
Rights: A Case Study, 51 WAsH. L. REv. 61, 94 n.177 (1975) (listing several unsuccessful
Congressional attempts to abrogate treaty fishing rights).
225. See supra part IV (describing evolution of Federal Indian policy).
226. Id.
227. Id.
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Terminationfor Conservation Purposes

Even if the Band were to convince the court that neither the 1837
treaty nor the hunting, fishing, and gathering rights guaranteed under
that treaty were terminated, the Band would then have to overcome
the State's argument that a state may regulate the off-reservation hunting and fishing of the tribe as a conservation measure, regardless of
any Indian treaty rights. 228 As noted regarding the state's ability to
regulate a tribe's exercise of off-reservation rights, the Supreme Court
has held that such regulation is permitted "in the interest of conservation, provided the regulation meets appropriate standards and does
not discriminate against the Indians." 229
In a later decision, 230 the Supreme Court elaborated and held that
in off-reservation cases "the appropriate standards requirement means
that the state must demonstrate that its regulation is a reasonable and
necessary conservation measure and that its application to the Indian
is necessary in the interest of conservation." 23 1
The State of Minnesota will likely argue that regulations prohibiting
gill netting and fish spearing should apply, as conservation measures,
to the Band's activities on the ceded territory of the 1837 treaty. However, the State is unlikely to successfully satisfy the narrow exception
that permits state regulation of off-reservation treaty rights based on
the facts of this case and a prior court ruling on similar facts. 23 2
Since netting and fish spearing are cultural and religious traditions
that are unique to the Indians, 23 3 any state regulation banning or
prohibiting these activities would likely be viewed by the court as discriminatory.234 As a result, the state regulation would not satisfy the
standard established to permit interference with Indian treaty rights.
Furthermore, this was the court's finding in the Wisconsin dispute in-

228. Complaint, supra note 181, at 5.
229. Puyallup Tribe v. Department of Game of Wash., 391 U.S. 392, 398, reh'g denied,
393 U.S. 898 (1968).
230. Antoine v. Washington, 420 U.S. 194 (1975).
231. Id. at 207 (holding that the Supremacy Clause precluded application of State
game laws to Indians hunting in an area ceded to the United States by an agreement
executed by the federal government and the Indian tribe).
232. Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Chippewa v. Wisconsin, 668 F. Supp. 1233 (W.D.
Wis. 1987).
233. See Complaint, supra note 181, at 4-5. See also Robert Whereatt, House Rejects
Mille Lacs Plan; Chippewa to Take Case to Court, STARTmiB. (Mpis.), May 4, 1993, at 1k
234. See Department of Game of Wash. v. Puyallup Tribe, 414 U.S. 44, 48 (1973)
(finding a state regulation against Indians to be discriminatory because "all Indian net
fishing is barred and only hook-and-line fishing, entirely pre-empted by non-Indians, is
allowed").
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volving the 1837 treaty and state fishing regulations similar to those
regulations Minnesota seeks to enforce against the Band.235
In addition, the State is likely to have difficulty convincing the court
that enforcement of fishing regulations against the Band is "necessary," given the fact that the Band is a member of the Great Lakes
Indian Fish and Wildlife Commission.236 This commission works
closely with other natural resource agencies to conserve fish resources
and restock the lakes.2 3 7 The Band's involvement in this conservation
effort renders any suggestion that Indian people are not competent to
manage natural resources nothing but racism.2 38 Consequently, the
State is not likely to be successful in obtaining judicial permission for
regulation of the Indians' off-reservation fishing, hunting and gather-

ing activities.
VIII.
A.

RECENT COURT HOLDING

Background

On August 24, 1994, the U.S. District Court for Minnesota ruled on
the issues involved in Phase I of the Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa v. Minnesota.23 9 The court and the parties had previously determined in
March 1991 that this dispute should be resolved by bifurcating the matter. 240 The court determined that the primary issues to resolve in
Phase I were: 1) whether the 1837 treaty privilege that granted the
Band the right to hunt, fish and gather wild rice on the ceded territory
continued to exist; 2) whether this privilege extended to privately
owned lands; and 3) the general nature of the treaty rights guaranteed
by the privilege. 2 41 If the court found that the privilege continued to
exist, then the parties would proceed to Phase II. The two main issues
reserved for Phase II were resource allocation issues and the validity of
particular regulatory measures affecting the exercise of the guaranteed
42
privilege. 2
The court asserted that the legal issues involved in Phase I required
the application of the special canons of construction used for inter235. Lac Courte Oreil/es Band of Chippewa, 668 F. Supp. at 1237 (stating that a facially

neutral state regulation, applied in a nondiscriminatory manner, may still discriminate
against tribal rights).
236. Priscilla Buffalohead, State Should Do Right By Indians, STARTRIB. (Mpls.), May
15, 1993, at 13A.
237. Id.
238. Id.
, 1994 U.S. Dist.
F. Supp. 239. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa v. Minnesota, LEXIS 11901 (D. Minn. Aug. 24, 1994).
240. Id. at *7.
241. Id.
242. Id. Although the current opinion did not directly address issues reserved for
Phase 11, the court did, however, take the opportunity to clearly establish the legal standards to be applied in Phase II. Id. at *174-77.
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preting Indian treaties.243 The court also clarified that it would consider the Seventh Circuit holding in Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Chippewa
v. Voig 2 44 as "convincing authority245 and stated that it was a "significant precedent for key issues in the case." 246
B.

Existence of the 1837 Privilege

With regard to the first issue in Phase I, the court held that the 1837
privilege granted to the Band did, in fact, continue to exist. 247 The

court based this holding on several findings of fact.
First, the court found that the Band did not consent to removal from
the ceded territory in the 1837 treaty. 248 This finding was based on the
fact that "[i]f removal had been intended, then it would have been a
topic of discussion during the treaty council, and the treaty would have
included provisions for moving the Chippewa similar to those in other
treaties with removal clauses." 24 9
Second, the court found that the Chippewa had not understood that
the 1837 treaty gave the President unrestricted discretion to revoke the
Indians' privilege to hunt, fish, and gather on the ceded territory, as
provided in Article Five of the treaty. 250 More specifically, the Chip-

pewa did not understand the phrase "during the pleasure of the President," that was included in Article Five, as a "finite limitation on their
continued way of life in the ceded territory."25 ' In addition, the court
found further evidence that the Chippewa did not understand this
phrase to mean the President could revoke their privilege at anytime
for any reason by the fact that there was no discussion of this subject
during the negotiations. 252
243. Id. at *115-16 ("The first rule is that Indian treaties must be construed as the
Indians understood them .... A second rule of construction requires any ambiguous
term in a treaty to be resolved in favor of the Indians .... Together these canons of
construction require a liberal interpretation in favor of the Indians.") (citing Jones v.
Meehan, 175 U.S. 1, 4-5 (1899); Winters v. United States, 207 U.S. 564, 576-77 (1908);
Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Chippewa v. Voigt, 700 F.2d 341, 350 (7th Cir. 1983)). For
further discussion of these canons see supra part II.B.
244. 700 F.2d 341 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 805 (1983).
245. Mill Lacs Band, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11901 at *119.
246. Id. at *118. The court rejected the defendant's arguments that it should not
apply the holding of Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Chippewa v. Voigt, 700 F.2d 341 (7th Cir.
1983), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 805 (1983) because it was wrongly decided. Id.
247. Id. at *183. The court rejected the arguments presented by the State, counties
and landowners that the privilege reserved in the 1837 treaty was "temporary and later
extinguished." Id. at *118.
248. Id. at *35, *124.
249. Id. at *31, *124.
250. Mille Lacs Band, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11901 at *35, *134-35.
251. Id. at *29.
252. Id. at *30. "The Chippewa who had persistently demanded to continue their
way of life during the treaty negotiations certainly would have objected ... if the literal
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Finally, the court also relied on the Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Chippewa v. Voigt253 holding in determining that the President's discretion
to revoke the privilege under Article Five was "restricted so long as the
Indians behaved well and peacefully.... "254 Based on the record, the
court found that there was no evidence of misbehavior by the Chip255
pewa that would warrant a revocation of their privilege.
Third, the court found that the removal order issued by President
Taylor in 1850256 did not extinguish the Band's privileges under the
1837 treaty. 257 The court based this determination primarily on the
finding that the removal order was outside the scope of the President's
authority.2 58 The removal order was outside the President's authority
because he had not received the consent of the Chippewa for their
removal, as required by Congress.2 59 In addition, the court also gave
consideration to the fact that the removal order was never enforced
against the Band.260
Fourth, the court found that the Band did not relinquish its 1837
privilege to hunt, fish, and gather in the 1855 treaty with the U.S. government.2 6 1 The court rejected the argument that the 1837 privilege
was extinguished under language in Article One of the 1855 treaty,
which stated that the "Indians do further fully and entirely relinquish
and convey to the United States, any and all right, title or interest, of
whatsoever nature the same may be, which they may now have in, and
to, any other lands in the territory of Minnesota or elsewhere." 26 2 The
meaning of the phrase had been conveyed." Id. Furthermore, the court maintained
that "[e]ven people fluent in twentieth century English ... might not understand the
legal meaning of 'at the pleasure of the President.'" Id.
253. 700 F.2d 341, 361 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 464 U.S. 805 (1983).
254. Milk Lacs Band, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11901 at *132-33.
255. Id. at *135.
256. See supra part V.C. discussing this order.
257. Mile Lacs Band, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11901 at *76. Applying the test established in Goldwaterv. Carter,444 U.S. 996 (1979), the court rejected the argument that
the court did not have jurisdiction to review the 1850 Removal Order on the grounds
that it presented a political question. Id. at *136-39. The court further noted that the
underlying motivation behind the removal effort was primarily economic. Id. at
*49-50, 135. "If Wisconsin Chippewa were removed to Minnesota, then Minnesota
traders would be more likely to benefit from the annuity payments made to the Indians
Id. at *49.
258. Id. at *125, *135-36. The court also noted the well-established rule that "[t]he
Constitution does not provide the President with the power to remove Indian tribes or
to abrogate rights guaranteed under treaties." Id. at *121-22. For further discussion of
the federal government's regulatory powers over treaty rights see supra part III.A.
259. Id. at *122 (citing the 1830 Removal Act § 2, 4 Stat. 411, 411-12).
260. Id. at *142-43, *76. The court noted that the removal effort was focused solely
on moving six Wisconsin bands to Minnesota and not on the removal of the Mille Lacs
Band. Id. at *70.
261. Id. at *156, *103.
262. Mile Lacs Band, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11901 at *143-44.
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court maintained that pursuant to the canons of construction, the absence of any reference in the 1855 treaty to hunting, fishing, and gathering rights required the court to consider what the Chippewa
understood and intended the 1855 treaty to mean. 263 The court held
that based on the "circumstances and legislative history of the 1855
treaty," neither the Chippewa nor Congress intended or understood
the 1855 treaty to relinquish the 1837 privilege.264
C.

No Extension of the Privilege to Private Lands

Regarding the second principal issue to be determined in Phase I,
the court held that the 1837 hunting, fishing, and gathering rights did
not extend to privately owned lands,2 65 because no right of access was
included in the 1837 privilege.2 66 However, the court was also careful
to note that the Band was not actually seeking the ability to exercise its
2 67
1837 rights on private property in this action.
D. General Nature of the Treaty Rights
The court held that the Band's hunting, fishing, and gathering
rights were not limited with regard to the type of resources harvested
or regarding the time, place, or manner of exercise of the guaranteed
1837 privilege.2 68 In addition, the court found that the privilege also
included the right to harvest the resources for commercial purposes. 2 69 The court based this finding on evidence that established
that the Chippewa understood the phrase "hunting, fishing and gathering the wild rice" to mean "living off the land," since "[i]n 1837 the
Chippewa used all of their surrounding natural resources to
survive." 270
263. Id. at *145-47.
264. Id. at *146-49. The court further noted that Band representatives at the 1855
treaty negotiations would not have knowingly given up the guaranteed privilege without

discussion, especially considering the fact that they "would have starved if they were
confined to the boundaries of their reservation." Id. at *147.
265. The court stated "privately owned lands do not include public lands formerly in
private ownership or private lands open to public hunting, fishing, and gathering." Id.
at *166 (citing Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Chippewa v. Wisconsin, 653 F. Supp. 1420,
1432 (W.D. Wis. 1987)).
266. Id. at *165-66.
267. Mille Lacs Band, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11901 at *166.
268. Id. at *172-74. The court rejected the argument that this issue should not be
addressed because the phrase "the general nature of the rights" had not been defined
in the bifurcation order. Id at *168.
269. Id. at *174.
270. Id at *172-73.
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E. Denial of Interlocutory Appeal
Finally, the court rejected the State's request that a decision in favor
of the Band be certified for interlocutory appea 27 1 under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1292(b).272 The court held the Phase I issues were not novel or complex, and the canons of construction and applicable law were well-established.273 Furthermore, the court maintained that there was "no
reason to believe that an immediate appeal would materially advance
the ultimate termination of the litigation."274 Rather, such an appeal
275
could result in a long delay.
IX.

CONCLUSION

The current dispute between the Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa and
the State of Minnesota is one more embarrassing and disgraceful chapter in this country's history of relations with the Indian nations. After
inducing Indian tribes to give up their land in exchange for treaty
rights and life on reservations, one would think that the very least state
governments could do is adhere to the promises guaranteed by the
United States government.
Unfortunately, this is typically not the case. Instead, many states, including Minnesota, continue to refuse to accept that the United States
Constitution preempts state authority over treaties between the federal government and Indian nations.276 Although the dispute is as yet
unresolved, a victory for the Mille Lacs Band should send a strong
message to the State of Minnesota, and other states, that federal courts
will no longer tolerate attempts to destroy Indian treaty rights.
Catherine M. Ovsak
271. "The Court of Appeals may choose to hear an appeal from an order that is not
otherwise appealable if the district court certifies that it 'involves a controlling question
of law as to which there is substantial ground for difference of opinion' and that an
'immediate appeal from the order may materially advance the ultimate termination of
the litigation.'" Id. at *179 (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1292 (b) (1988)).
272. Mille Lacs Band, 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 11901 at *177-81.
273. Id. at *180.
274. Id.
275. Id. at *181. The court referred to the fact that prior settlement efforts had
failed between the parties and there was a strong likelihood of the defendants to "also
seek a hearing by the Supreme Court if unsuccessful after any interlocutory appeal." Id.
9'a. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
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